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Significant Impediment to Industry 





A novel theory of harm is crystalising in European Union (“EU”) merger control. 
Under this theory, the EU Commission (“Commission”) can intervene in mer-
gers that it considers generally reduce innovation incentives in an industry as a 
whole. This theory of harm can be referred to as the Significant Impediment to 
Industry Innovation (“SIII”) theory. 
This policy paper first attempts to describe the content and extent of the SIII 
theory (I). Second, it shows that the SIII theory marks a departure from estab-
lished EU merger control practice (II). Third, it discusses the economic founda-
tions of the SIII theory (III). Finally, it puts forward best practices for the 
assessment of mergers in R&D intensive industries (IV). With this, the present 
paper hopes to assist in the development of sound merger control policy in inno-
vative markets, and undermine crude conjectures on the relationship between 
market structure, patent statistics and industry innovation theory.  
I. The Theory: Unpacking SIII 
Recent statements by the Commission point towards the emergence of a novel 
theory of harm in merger control. In short, the theory provides that a merger can 
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and should be prohibited where it can be demonstrated that it will “lead to a reduc-
tion of innovation” in a given industry “as a whole.”1   
The roots of the SIII theory can be found in the Commission’s Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines which state that “effective competition may be significantly impeded by a 
merger between two important innovators.”2 To date, this sentence had been inter-
preted as allowing the Commission to intervene in mergers that would give rise 
to a reduction in R&D expenditure in relation to specific foreseeable product 
applications (either because the merging parties develop so-called “pipeline” prod-
ucts or because the merger leads to the elimination of a potential competitor vis-
à-vis an existing product market).3 However, the application of the SIII theory of 
harm would extend the reach of the EU Merger Regulation4 to any transaction 
that will lead to a “general reduction in R&D in an industry.”5 
This new theory seems to draw inspiration from a 2016 research paper by econo-
mists Justus Haucap and Joel Stiebale,6 and a subsequent policy paper published 
                                                 
1 See Directorate-General for Competition (“DG COMP”), Press release: Commission opens in-depth inves-
tigation into proposed merger between Dow and DuPont, 11 August 2016, available at http://eu-
ropa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2784_en.htm.  
2 European Commission, Assessment of Horizontal Mergers Under Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 
of 5 May 2004, Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the 
Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings (“Horizontal Merger Guidelines”), paras. 20(b) and 38, 
2004 O.J. (C 31) 7, 9, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-con-
tent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52004XC0205(02)&from=EN.   
3 European Commission, DG Competition, Competition policy brief: EU Merger Control and Innovation, 
April 2016, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpb/2016/2016_001_en.pdf. 
See also Raphaël De Coninck, Innovation in EU merger control: in need of a consistent framework, Sympo-
sium: Competition and Innovation, Competition Law Policy and Debate, Volume 2, Issue 3, Septem-
ber 2016, available at https://www.crai.com/sites/default/files/publications/Innovation-in-EU-
merger-control-in-a-need-of-a-consistent-framework.pdf. 
4 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between under-
takings (“EU Merger Regulation”), 2004 O.J. (L 24) 1, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-con-
tent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32004R0139&from=EN.  
5 Dow DuPont Challenge EU’s View of “Innovation,” MLEX, 7 September 2016; Comment: Dow, DuPont 
deal reaches tipping point in Brussels, MLEX, 13 January 2017; Patents Said to Be Scrutinized as EU Weighs 
Deal, BLOOMBERG, 26 January 2017. 
6 Haucap, Justus, and Joel Stiebale, How Mergers Affect Innovation: Theory and Evidence from the Pharma-
ceutical Industry, Discussion Paper No. 218, Düsseldorf Institute of Competition Economics 
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in the Harvard Business Review (hereafter, the “papers”).7 The main thrust of the 
papers can be distilled into three points. First, mergers in R&D intensive indus-
tries not only reduce the innovation incentives of the merging parties, but also 
decrease their competitors’ innovation incentives. Second, competition agencies 
should focus on the “innovation activities” of industry participants, instead of look-
ing at specific present and/or future product and/or technology markets.8 The 
notion of innovation activities seems to refer to asset-specific investments in up-
stream innovation inputs. Third, general “innovation activities” are measured by 
R&D expenditure and R&D intensity. Both indicators act as good proxies to 
gauge the innovation incentives of the merged entity and/or its competitors. The 
papers conclude by advocating for a less lenient treatment of horizontal concen-
tration in R&D intensive industries, and call on competition agencies to inter-
vene where mergers are predicted to lead to a reduction of innovative activities in 
an industry “as a whole.” 
According to external observers, the SIII theory is being applied by the Commis-
sion in relation to horizontal mergers, and, in particular, as part of its ongoing in-
vestigation of the Dow/DuPont merger, which (as of the end of January 2017) 
hangs in the balance. More specifically, it is reported that the Commission is 
pursuing an innovation theory of harm that is not anchored in specific product 
markets and/or a pipeline of innovative products, but a general reduction of in-
novation competition intensity in crop protection.9 In essence, the Commission 
is said to be considering a simple question: post-transaction, will there be a reduc-
tion of R&D expenditure in the industry? If this emerging policy is confirmed, 
the SIII theory may well be applied to other merger transactions in R&D-driven 
industries, with the pharmaceutical sector being most obviously in the crosshairs.  
II. Merger Practice 
To date, the Commission has never intervened in or prohibited a merger purely 
on the basis of a general “reduction of innovation” activities in an industry “as a 
                                                 
7 Haucap, Justus, and Joel Stiebale, Research: Innovation Suffers When Drug Companies Merge, HARVARD 
BUSINESS REVIEW, 3 August 2016, available at https://hbr.org/2016/08/research-innovation-suffers-
when-drug-companies-merge.   
8 DG COMP Director-General Johannes Laitenberger has stressed that the Commission is able to 
take into account “the innovation potential of the merging firms regardless of their current market position.” 
See Johannes Laitenberger, Competition and Innovation, CRA Annual Conference, Brussels, 9 Decem-
ber 2015, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2015_04_en.pdf.    
9 Dow DuPont Challenge EU’s View of Innovation, op cit. 
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whole.” On the contrary, the practice has been to intervene in mergers that may 
lead to a reduction of innovation competition through the combination of firms 
with strong capabilities to innovate in a specific direction. This paper discusses a 
few representative cases (1), and then provides some context (2).10 
A. Cases 
In Pasteur-Mérieux/Merck, two pharmaceutical firms wanted to establish a joint 
venture (“JV”), to combine their human vaccines and related activities.11 The 
Commission noted that the JV would only take over the post-Phase II clinical 
trials, and that the parties would remain autonomous in their basic R&D deci-
sions. However, the bylaws of the JV provided that the R&D strategy of the JV 
and the parents for the benefit of the JV would be overseen by a development 
committee. As part of this oversight function, the R&D activities of the parents, 
including communications concerning discoveries, would be discussed within the 
committee. Consequently, it could not be excluded that these discussions would 
lead to the coordination of the basic R&D decisions of the merging parties. 
Therefore, the Commission found that the JV was likely to have an appreciable 
effect on R&D for future pipeline products.12 But it nonetheless issued an exemp-
tion decision due to efficiency gains. According to Glader, Pasteur-Mérieux/Merckx 
represents the “most extreme line of R&D competition analysis,” and it is “certainly not 
the typical situation.”13 Yet, the analysis carried out in Pasteur Mérieux/Merck is not 
tantamount to an SIII analysis. It focuses on the merging parties’ innovation in-
                                                 
10 The cases discussed in this paper are limited to those in which a formal decision has already been 
published. We understand however that innovation effects have been assessed in some more recent 
transactions where the decisions are not yet publicly available, or where the case was withdrawn and a 
decision was never issued (e.g., General Electric/Alstom, Novartis/Glaxo Smith Kline’s Oncology Business, 
Halliburton/Baker Hughes). For more on some of these cases, see De Coninck, Innovation in EU merger 
control: in need of a consistent framework, op cit.; DG Competition, Competition policy brief: EU Merger 
Control and Innovation, op cit.  
11 Commission Decision, Case IV/34.776 of 6 October 1994, Pasteur Merieux-Merck, 1994 O.J. (L 
309), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-con-
tent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31994D0770&from=EN. The decision is formally based on Article 
101, because it was issued in 1994, prior to the entry into force of the revised EU Merger Regulation 
in 1997. 
12 Ibid., para. 64.  
13 MARCUS GLADER, INNOVATION MARKETS AND COMPETITION ANALYSIS: EU COMPETITION LAW 
AND US ANTITRUST LAW (2006), page 164. 
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centives. And the analysis is expressly framed by reference to specific future pipe-
line products, namely monovalent vaccines, not the (human) vaccines industry as 
a whole. 
In Glaxo/Wellcome, the Commission scrutinized the effect of the merger of two 
pharmaceutical companies “in the area of R&D.”14 The Commission’s analysis fo-
cused on HIV/AIDS therapeutics, where it found “overlaps” in the parties’ R&D 
activities.15 Ultimately, it concluded that the transaction would not give rise to 
competitive concerns, and issued a Phase I clearance decision. In particular, the 
Commission considered that in the absence of a definitive treatment for 
HIV/AIDS, the merger was not likely to significantly inhibit the research for ef-
fective compounds being undertaken by other pharmaceutical companies world-
wide.16 To some extent, Glaxo/Wellcome has elements of an SIII analysis, insofar 
as the decision considers the effect of the merger on third parties’ incentives to 
innovate. At the same time, however, the decision is not entirely consistent with 
SIII. The approach that was followed to assess a potential reduction of innovation 
incentives shows that it is necessary to delineate a specific upstream R&D sector.17 
Moreover, the decision suggests that in cases where potential commercial/thera-
peutic applications cannot (yet) be identified, mergers have no adverse effect on 
innovation R&D incentives.  
In Bayer/Aventis Crop Science, the Commission noted from the outset that there 
are reasons to be concerned about “the grouping of companies with strength in R&D 
and innovation.”18 In turn, the Commission sought to assess the effect of the trans-
action on the parties’ “R&D capabilities and incentives,” in relation to specific “cur-
rent product markets and future product markets.”19 Put differently, the Commission’s 
assessment of R&D incentives was undertaken at the more granular level of de-
fined antitrust markets. 
                                                 
14 Merger Procedure Article 6(1)b Non-Opposition Decision of 28 February 1995, Case 
IV/M.555, Glaxo/Wellcome, para. 18, 1995 O.J. (C 065) 6, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competi-
tion/mergers/cases/decisions/m555_en.pdf. 
15 Ibid., para. 33. 
16 Ibid. 
17 GLADER, INNOVATION MARKETS AND COMPETITION ANALYSIS EU COMPETITION LAW AND US AN-
TITRUST LAW, op cit.  
18 Commission Decision, Case COMP/M.2547 of 12 July 2000, Bayer/Aventis Crop Science, para. 18, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m2547_en.pdf.  
19 Ibid. 
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In Glaxo Wellcome/SmithKline Beecham, the Commission took the view that it was 
necessary to assess the impact of the transaction on “R&D markets.”20 As part of 
its assessment, the Commission considered whether the combination of two phar-
maceutical companies would lead to a reduction of the “overall R&D potential” in 
the development of treatments for “Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease” 
(“COPD”).21 The Commission noted there was a considerable “unmet clinical need 
in this segment” because none of the current or pipeline products acted as an “ef-
fective single treatment for COPD.”22 As in Glaxo/Wellcome, the Commission hinted 
that the lack of foreseeable therapeutic application was a factor that was likely to 
incentivize R&D, rather than to diminish it.23  
Syngenta/Monsanto’s Sunflower Seed Business is another case where innovation in-
centives were scrutinized.24 Here, the results of the market investigation indicated 
that the transaction would have led to the removal of a “strong innovative market 
player.”25 The Commission considered whether the post-transaction merged entity 
would have had the ability and incentive to foreclose other breeders from access 
to its extensive germplasm portfolio, a key biotechnological input. The adoption 
of such a foreclosure strategy by the merged entity would have undermined the 
ability of smaller competitors to innovate in the market for the commercialisation 
of sunflower hybrids in Spain and Hungary. Ultimately, farmers would have suf-
fered from reduced choice compared to the situation that would have prevailed 
absent the concentration.26  
In addition to this input foreclosure theory of harm, the text of the decision sug-
gests that increased concentration could lead to a lower rate of innovation. In 
particular, in its assessment of the effects of the transaction on the Hungarian 
                                                 
20 Merger Procedure Article 6(1)b Non-Opposition Decision, Case COMP/M.1846 of 8 May 2000, 
Glaxo Wellcome/SmithKline Beecham, para. 174, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mer-
gers/cases/decisions/m1846_en.pdf.  
21 Ibid., paras. 179-188.    
22 Ibid., para. 187. 
23 Ibid., para. 188. This was confirmed by the large number of “pipeline products and resourceful competi-
tors on the market.” 
24 Commission Decision Case COMP/M.5675 of 17 November 2010, Syngenta/Monsanto’s Sunflower 
Seed Business, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/deci-
sions/m5675_20101117_20600_1556193_EN.pdf.   
25 Ibid., para. 248.  
26 Ibid., paras. 200 and 207. 
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market for the commercialisation of sunflower hybrids, the Commission con-
cluded that the transaction was “likely to have a negative impact on innovation by 
eliminating the competitive constraint that the breeding programme and the germplasm of 
Monsanto exerted on Syngenta and on other competitors to regularly bring new improved 
varieties into the market.”27 It is, however, not entirely clear to what extent this find-
ing influenced the Commission’s view that the transaction would have impeded 
effective competition in Hungary. 
B. Context 
The consistent practice of the Commission is not to disregard the effect of market 
concentration on innovation incentives. It is taken into account. However, the 
Commission’s assessment of innovation effects has never been undertaken at the 
general industry or sector level. Rather, innovation incentives are systematically 
assessed with “specific ties to a well-defined current or future market.”28  
Interestingly, the Commission’s decisional practice can be contrasted with the 
limited experience of U.S. antitrust agencies, where the analysis has occasionally 
focused on situations where a merger would be deemed injurious to competition 
on separate upstream “innovation markets” that are not directly linked to a down-
stream current or future product market.29  The development of an “innovation 
markets” framework in U.S. merger control enables regulators to look at the effect 
of a merger on the “R&D process itself,” and on firms’ ability and incentives to 
commit resources to R&D activities. In contrast to the SIII theory, the delinea-
tion of separate upstream R&D markets where firms compete through invest-
ments for future technological applications is a key component of the “innovation 
markets” framework.30  
This analysis is interesting in that the identification of separate upstream innova-
tion markets implicitly recognises that the players active in those markets are not 
necessarily the same as those that compete with the merging parties in down-
stream product markets. Upstream innovation markets are often characterised by 
                                                 
27 Ibid., para. 321. 
28 See De Coninck, Innovation in EU merger control: in need of a consistent framework, op cit., page 48.  
29 Richard J. Gilbert and Steven C. Sunshine, Incorporating dynamic efficiency concerns in merger analysis: 
The use of innovation markets, ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL, Volume 63, Number 2 (1995), pages 569-601. 
30 Ibid.  
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a wider pool of participants, including, inter alia, public and private research in-
stitutions and tech start-ups. Participants in upstream discovery markets are not 
necessarily active in the commercialisation of their innovations.31   
The Commission’s decisions in Glaxo Wellcome/SmithKline Beecham and Syn-
genta/Monsanto’s Sunflower Seed Business may give the impression that a certain 
degree of “innovation markets” analysis has been undertaken in EU merger control 
cases; and that the EU Merger Regulation provides a framework that accommo-
dates an SIII-type analysis. Yet, a careful examination of the Commission’s deci-
sional practice compels a different conclusion. Indeed, a review of EU merger 
control decisions suggests that the Commission’s theories of harm have never 
been predicated on the adverse effect of a transaction on R&D markets.  In Glaxo 
Wellcome/SmithKline Beecham, the Commission dismissed concerns of adverse ef-
fects on R&D markets.32 And the statement in Syngenta/Monsanto’s Sunflower Seed 
Business reads as a laconic endorsement of one of several negative views that were 
gathered from third parties during the market investigation. In addition, there is 
no suggestion in either of the decisions that the Commission assessed whether 
the transaction would lead to a reduction in the R&D spend/innovation incen-
tives of the merged entity, its rivals and/or of the whole industry, as required 
under the U.S. “innovation markets” framework. In a 2016 article, two Commission 
officials reached a similar conclusion stating that “innovation markets” analysis was 
not a part of EU merger control policy.33  
Moreover, this interpretation of the application of the EU Merger Regulation is 
consistent with the approach followed by the Commission in other areas of EU 
competition law. In particular, the application of the prohibition against anticom-
                                                 
31 In some cases, it is unfeasible to do so because of the time and cost associated with bringing a prod-
uct to market (e.g. regulatory approvals for pharmaceutical products). Therefore, it is not uncommon 
for upstream innovators to rely on larger businesses with a downstream market presence and the nec-
essary scale to monetise (and fund) their R&D activities. The importance of this symbiotic relation-
ship should not be downplayed, and needs to be taken into account in the assessment of a merger’s 
impact on the “R&D process itself.” 
32 Glaxo Wellcome/SmithKline Beecham, op cit. 
33 According to Sebastian Müller and Arthur Stril of the Commission’s Directorate-General for Com-
petition (“DG COMP”), “Whilst other competition authorities such as the U.S. antitrust agencies have de-
fined and assessed innovation markets in the past, the Commission has not.”  See Sebastian Müller and 
Arthur Stril, European Merger Control and Innovation Competition: Moving the Goalpost, Symposium: 
Competition and Innovation, COMPETITION LAW POLICY AND DEBATE, Volume 2, Issue 3, Septem-
ber 2016, page 53. 
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petitive agreements to R&D co-operation between competitors where “in the ab-
sence of exceptional circumstances, the Commission would not try to assess the impact of 
a given R&D co-operation on innovation, but would limit its assessment to existing product 
and/or technology markets which are related to the R&D co-operation in question.”34   
Against this background, it follows that the introduction of the SIII theory to EU 
merger control would be a quantum leap. Is this warranted? 
III. Economics 
A. Theory 
Advances in economics and our understanding of markets may justify changes to 
established merger control practice. But any such change can only be justified 
where two conditions are fulfilled. First, the legal framework must permit it. Prac-
tical guidance on the application of EU merger control rules is primarily con-
tained in soft law instruments (for example, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines), 
which contain significant caveats, and resort to examples instead of principled 
statements.35 The Commission therefore enjoys wide discretion and is able to de-
part from its previous practice and/or the principles set out in its guidelines, as 
long as it does not frustrate “legitimate expectations.”36  
Second, changes to merger control practice should be based on sound economic 
arguments backed by empirical evidence.  With this, it is instructive to look at the 
economic foundation of the SIII theory of harm. As is well known, the relation-
ship between firm size, market structure and innovation has remained unsettled 
in economic theory since Joseph Schumpeter.37 In the scholarship, this issue can 
be compared with Hilbert’s problems or Fermat’s last theorem for mathemati-
cians: it keeps attracting the interest of the finest experts, including a host of 
                                                 
34 See European Commission, Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union to horizontal cooperation agreements (“Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines”), 2011 
O.J. (C 11), paras. 122, 26, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-con-
tent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52011XC0114(04)&from=EN.  
35 In relation to the topic of this paper, see Horizontal Merger Guidelines, op cit., paragraph 20(b). 
36 Nicolas Petit and Miguel Rato, From Hard to Soft Enforcement of EC Competition Law - A Bestiary of 
'Sunshine' Enforcement Instruments (2008), page 4, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=1270109.  
37 JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (1942).  
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Nobel Prize winners such as Stiglitz,38 Phelps,39 Stigler,40 Arrow,41 and probably 
more to come. In recent years, improvements in our understanding of economics 
have been achieved through theoretical and empirical studies (to which Haucap 
and Stiebale contribute).42 Yet, unlike other areas where economic research has 
yielded policy outcomes that are now a part of antitrust orthodoxy, e.g., the posi-
tive relationship between industry concentration and collusion, it is not possible 
to draw presumptive conclusions on the link between concentration and innova-
tion.43  
Against this backdrop, Katz and Shelanski recommend that inquiries “about the 
effects of specific transactions within a particular industry based on a fact-intensive inves-
tigation into the incentives and capabilities of actual and potential innovators.”44 In do-
ing so, they underline that “such fact-intensive, case-by-case inquiries are the better 
course than the systematic retreat from enforcement in dynamic settings for which the 
‘Schumpeterian’ school argues.”  
B. Application 
Let us try to understand the implications of Katz and Shelanski’s best principles 
for the assessment of mergers in R&D driven industries.45 To keep the analysis 
sufficiently concrete, let us focus on the seed and agrochemical industry where 
ongoing mergers could be potentially candidates for a SIII risk assessment in the 
                                                 
38 Partha Dasgupta and Joseph Stiglitz, Industrial Structure and the Nature of Innovative Activity, ECO-
NOMIC JOURNAL, Volume 90, Issue 358 (1980), pages 266-293. 
39 Edmund S. Phelps, Toward a Model of Innovation and Performance: Along the Lines of Knight, Keynes, 
Hayek, and M. Polanyi, in ZOLTAN J. ACS, DAVID B. AUDRETSCH AND ROBERT J. STROM, ENTREPRE-
NEURSHIP, GROWTH, AND PUBLIC POLICY (2008), pages 35-70. 
40 George J. Stigler, Industrial Organization and Economic Progress, in L. D. WHITE, ED., THE STATE OF 
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1956) 269-82.  
41 Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DI-
RECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS (NBER, 1962), pages 609-26.  
42 Carl Shapiro, Competition and Innovation: Did Arrow Hit the Bull's Eye? in JOSH LERNER AND SCOTT 
STERN, THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY REVISITED (2011), pages 361-404; Michael 
L. Katz, and Howard A. Shelanski, Mergers and Innovation, ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL Volume 74, Is-
sue 1, (2007), pages 1-85 (“The results suggest that few presumptions can be drawn even if transactions are bro-
ken down by industry and by their domestic versus cross-border nature”). 
43 Reinhilde Veugelers, Innovation in EU Merger Control: Walking the Talk, BRUEGEL POLICY CONTRIBU-
TION, Issue 2012/04, February 2012, page 8, available at http://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/im-
ported/publications/pc_2012_04__FINAL.pdf.   
44 Katz and Shelanski, Mergers and Innovation, op cit. 
45 Dow/DuPont, ChemChina/Syngenta and Bayer/Monsanto.  
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EU. Note that the analysis is preliminary, and only purports to assess if the in-
dustry displays features which justify prima facie SIII concerns. 
To start, this paper examines empirical data. The two tables below compile high 
level data on the R&D expenditure (table 1) and R&D intensity (table 2) of six 
leading agrochemical companies. These data – which we concede again are high 
level estimates – have been extracted from the EU Industrial R&D Scoreboards 
between 2009 and 2016.46 During that timeframe, all six firms clearly increased 
their total R&D expenditure. In addition, R&D intensity during the same period 
either increased (Syngenta, DuPont, Monsanto) or remained stable (BASF, Bayer 
and Dow Chemical have maintained a consistent level of R&D expenditure with 
a possible 0.1% variation). Moreover, this increase in R&D intensity has taken 
place in spite of a dramatic drop in global agricultural commodity prices, 47 which 
has adversely affected several agrochemical businesses.48 
  
                                                 
46 The EU Industrial R&D Investment Scorecard, EU Science Hub, Economics of Industrial Research 
and Innovation, European Commission Joint Research Centre, available at http://iri.jrc.ec.eu-
ropa.eu/scoreboard.html.    
47 Food commodity Prices Fall for Fifth Year in a Row in 2016, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION, 
12 January 2016, http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/462790/icode/; Global Food Prices Drop to 
a Five-Year Low, THE WORLD BANK, 1 July 2015, http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-re-
lease/2015/07/01/global-food-prices-drop-to-a-five-year-low; Emiko Terazono, Agricultural Commodities 
feel the bite of weaker demand, FINANCIAL TIMES, 12 August 2015, https://www.ft.com/con-
tent/0694895a-400f-11e5-b98b-87c7270955cf.    
48 See, e.g., Sheenagh Matthews, BASF Quarterly Profit Hurt by Weak Demand for Crop Chemicals, 
BLOOMBERG, 27 July 2016, available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-27/basf-
quarterly-profit-misses-estimates-on-lower-oil-operations; Brian Blackstone, Syngenta Profits Down on 
Weak Commodity Prices, Global Uncertainty, WALL STREET JOURNAL, 22 July 2016, available at 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/syngenta-profit-down-on-weak-commodity-prices-global-uncertainty-
1469172890; Jack Kaskey, Monsanto to Cut 12% of Workforce as It Forecasts Profit Drop, BLOOMBERG, 7 
October 2015, available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-07/monsanto-profit-
forecast-misses-estimates-amid-grain-bear-market; Jack Kaskey, DuPont Cuts Profit Forecast Amid Weaker 
Agriculture, BLOOMBERG, 28 July 2015, available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-
07-28/dupont-cuts-profit-forecast-amid-weaker-agriculture.   
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Table 1 
R&D Total mill€ 2009 2011 2010 2012 2013 2014 2015 
SYNGENTA 669.1 769.3 871 949.7 997.8 1,177.8 1,251.0 
BASF 1410.0 1507.0 1622 1766.0 1,914.0 1,846.0 1,914.0 
BAYER 2964.0 3211.0 3045 3182.0 4,436.0 3,689.0 4,436.0 
DUPONT 960.4 1230.7 1511.7 1566.6 1,743.4 1,702.5 1,743.4 
DOW CHEMICAL 1039.8 1237.4 1272.1 1294.5 1265.3 1,356.6 1,467.8 




R&D Intensity % 2009 2011 2010 2012 2013 2014 2015 
SYNGENTA 8.7 8.9 8.5 8.8 9.4 9.4 10.2 
BASF 2.8 2.4 2.2 2.2 2.5 2.5 2.7 
BAYER 9.5 9.2 8.3 8.0 8.1 8.7 9.4 
DUPONT 5.3 5.2 5.2 5.9 6.0 5.9 7.5 
DOW CHEMICAL 3.3 3.1 2.7 3.0 3.1 2.8 3.3 
MONSANTO 9.4 11.5 11.2 11.2 10.3 10.8 10.5 
 
The figures in Tables 1 and 2 are not prima facie indicative of a significant risk of 
reduced innovation incentives due to market concentration, and thus do not sup-
port the application of an SIII analysis to mergers in the agrochemical sectors, 
like Dow/DuPont.  
However, empirical data is often not univocal, and dataset interpretation is no 
exact science. In this regard, the 2016 testimony of Diana Moss, the president of 
the American Antitrust Institute (“AAI”), before the US Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee (the “AAI Testimony”), paints a radically different picture of innovation 
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in the U.S. agricultural biotechnology and seeds sector.49 The AAI Testimony sug-
gests that agricultural biotechnology and seed markets are already concentrated 
and marked by “growing evidence of flagging innovation.”50 In support of the conclu-
sion that “consolidation will eliminate competition in agricultural biotechnology innova-
tion markets,” the AAI cites R&D statistics taken from a study by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (“USDA”).51 According to the AAI, those figures show 
that spending on R&D in crop seed and biotechnology increased by 138% be-
tween 1994 and 2010.52 However, by the late 2000s, R&D intensity (i.e., the R&D 
to sales ratio) dropped to the lower levels experienced in the mid-1990s. This 
trend led the USDA to conclude that concentration in agricultural input markets 
is no longer a driver for increased R&D or R&D intensity. The AAI relies on this 
conclusion to call “into question long standing arguments that concentration is needed 
to generate economies of scale in R&D.”53  
We have carefully reviewed the AAI Testimony, as well as the background sources 
that it uses to support its claims. Unfortunately, the AAI Testimony misrepresents 
the conclusions of the USDA study.54 The USDA study expressly states that: “the 
underlying causes of growing concentration in these sectors appear to be quite specific to 
each sector and may not have affected private incentives to invest in R&D” (emphasis 
added).55 This is a weak basis to support the radical enforcement initiatives advo-
cated by the AAI report, and, in particular, the prohibition of several high profile 
                                                 
49 Diana Moss (American Antitrust Institute), Consolidation and Competition in the U.S. Seed and Agro-
chemical Industry, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, 20 September 2016, availa-
ble at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/09-20-16 Moss Testimony.pdf.   
50 Ibid., page 2.  
51 Ibid.  
52 Ibid., page 5.  
53 Ibid. See, e.g., Jorge Fernandez-Cornejo, The seed industry in US agriculture: An Exploration of Data and 
Information on Crop Seed Markets, Regulation, Industry Structure, and Research and Development, Agricul-
tural Information Bulletin No. (AIB-786), ERS (U.S.D.A. 2004), page 9, available at 
https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/aib786/13616_aib786_1_.pdf?v=41055, (“Prelimi-
nary empirical results for U.S. cotton and corn seed industries over the past 30 years suggest that increased con-
centration resulted in a cost-reducing effect that prevailed over the effect of enhanced market power”). 
54 One should also point out that the some of the references in the footnotes of the AAI Testimony 
are incorrect (see footnotes 13 and 15). The USDA statistics that are cited, and in particular the 
138% figure, are attributable to a study cited elsewhere in the AAI Testimony, namely, Keith O. 
Fuglie et al., Research Investments and Market Structure in the Food Processing, Agricultural Input, and Bio-
fuel Industries Worldwide, Economic Research Report 130, ERS (U.S.D.A. 2011), available at 
https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/err130/11777_err130_1_.pdf.  
55 Ibid., page 15. 
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transactions such as the Dow/DuPont and Bayer/Monsanto mergers.56 Further-
more, the USDA study goes on to consider the “factors driving consolidation and 
concentration” in various agricultural input markets. In the crop seed and biotech-
nology sector, the principal factor driving consolidation is the “[A]cquisition of 
complementary technology and marketing assets, economics of scale in crop biotechnology 
R&D.”57 
To complete this preliminary empirical assessment, we have turned to analytical 
sources. An extensive review of the copious economic literature on innovation in 
the agrochemical and seeds industries has been undertaken. It is remarkable that 
many papers published in the field seek to nuance the basic premise that R&D 
is the main driver of industry innovation in agricultural biotechnology.58 Piergio-
vanni and Santarelli, for instance, note that  
R&D does not represent the sole input through which firms can produce some 
innovative outcomes…. [E]xpenditures in improved machinery and capital 
equipment may play a crucial role in the development of new patentable 
items, a role not necessarily less important than that played by R&D expend-
itures. This implies complementarity rather than substitutability between 
R&D and capital expenditures, also in a science-based industry such as bio-
technology.59  
In the same vein, Pardey, et al. explain that  
                                                 
56 Ibid., page 14 (“We generally expect research investments to be correlated with industry sales (i.e., that re-
search intensity, or the R&D-to-sales ratio, remains stable over time) unless other factors are changing incentives 
for private R&D. Other factors include (1) expectations that future demand growth will accelerate, (2) advances 
in scientific knowledge that have created new technological opportunities for commercialization, and (3) stronger 
IPR or changes in market structure that have made it easier for private R&D investors to appropriate economic 
benefits of new technology”). 
57 Ibid., table 1.8. 
58 This policy paper does not aim to discuss, but rather simply to point out that there are numerous 
studies that underscore the significant impact of public R&D on private R&D and innovation in the 
agricultural biotechnology space. See, for instance, Innovation, Agricultural Productivity and Sustainability 
in the United States, OECD, November 2016, page 590 , available at http://www.oecd.org/publica-
tions/innovation-agricultural-productivity-and-sustainability-in-the-united-states-9789264264120-
en.htm (“One implication of the complementarity between public and private research is that continued robust 
public investments in science may be necessary to prevent private agricultural R&D spending from eventually ta-
pering off”). 
59 Roberta Piergiovanni and Enrico Santarelli, The More You Spend, the More You Get? The Effects of 
R&D and Capital Expenditures on the Patenting Activities of Biotechnology Firms, SCIENTOMETRICS, Vol-
ume 94, Issue 2 (2013), pages 497-521. 
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Research focused on food and agriculture is not the only source of innovation 
in the sector. The results of public and private research in the broader biolog-
ical and informatics sciences, engineering, ecology, health, and numerous 
other areas of inquiry also show up as innovations in food and agriculture 
(and vice versa).60 
It follows that there are several sources of agricultural biotechnology innovations, 
and that they may be the result of disruptive shocks that originate in other fields.61  
In view of the above, the risk of a reduction of industry innovation due to in-
creased concentration in the agrochemical and seeds industries is far from estab-
lished; and the case for a departure from merger control practice with the 
introduction of a novel SIII test is not compelling. The current EU merger control 
framework, which enables the Commission to conduct a prospective analysis of 
innovation effects in current or future product markets seems to provide an ap-
propriate safeguard against anticompetitive transactions. 
IV. Best Practices 
In conclusion, this paper offers policy recommendations that are intended to 
guide the assessment of mergers in R&D-driven industries. 
A. Appreciable Effects 
If SIII theory (or innovation markets analysis) is to become a feature of EU merger 
control practice, a reduction in innovation incentives per se should not trigger 
enforcement action under the EU control merger rules. The legal test in the EU 
Merger Regulation stipulates that a “significant impediment to effective competition” 
must be established.62 Moreover, to the extent an impediment to industry inno-
vation can be established, the Commission must demonstrate that such an im-
pediment translates into a significant impediment to effective competition. In 
order to do so, it would need to be demonstrated that innovation is indeed a 
competitive parameter in the markets affected by a merger (since firms do not 
                                                 
60 Philip G. Pardey, Connie Chan-Kang, Jason M. Beddow, and Steven P. Dehmer, Long-Run and 
Global R&D Funding Trajectories: The U.S. Farm bill in a Changing Context, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF AG-
RICULTURAL ECONOMICS, Volume 97, Issue 5 (2015), pages 1312-1323.  
61 James Mitra, Joyce Tait, and David Wield, From Maturity to Value-added Innovation: Lessons from the 
Pharmaceutical and Agro-biotechnology Industries, TRENDS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY, Volume 29, Issue 3 
(2011), pages 105-109 (noting that the pharmaceutical and agricultural industries are susceptible “to 
‘technological shocks’, as new scientific knowledge and path-breaking technologies broaden the spectrum of op-
tions for R&D and strategic management”). 
62 See EU Merger Regulation, recitals 24-26.  
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compete for customers on the basis of their overall R&D expenditure). No obvi-
ous reason justifies – nor has been advanced – to lower the threshold of inquiry 
to any and all impediments to industry innovation.  
In practical terms, we believe that the magnitude of a merger’s adverse effects on 
industry participants’ R&D efforts should not be trivial or transitory in order to 
warrant regulatory intervention. Additionally, there are better alternatives to us-
ing projected R&D expenditure in order to assess innovation effects. For in-
stance, one possible proxy that could be used as preliminary screening tool is 
examining whether a merger will negatively impact the classification of a firm on 
the four-tier “technology group” scale that is conventionally used by R&D experts. 
This classification evaluates individual companies by reference to the intensity of 
their R&D programmes, distinguishing ‘high-technology’, ‘medium high-technology’, 
‘medium low-technology’ and ‘low-technology’ firms.63 For instance, the Commission 
could, by reference to the parties’ internal documents, seek to assess whether a 
merger between two high-technology firms would lead to the re-classification of 
the merged entity as a “medium-high” technology firm, e.g., due to the realisation 
of synergies and the implementation of cost-cutting measures. However, the use 
of preliminary merger screening tools should never obviate the need to conduct 
a fact-intensive investigation, including qualitative competitive analyses (see be-
low), in line with the approach advocated by Katz and Shelanski.  
B. R&D and Patent Statistics 
Drawing causal inferences from R&D figures and patent statistics in a merger 
control context is dangerous. Take R&D intensity, which measures the ratio of 
R&D expenses (numerator) to sales (denominator). This R&D intensity can in-
crease or decrease for a variety of reasons that do not necessarily correlate with an 
increase or decrease in the intensity of innovation. It is very difficult to measure 
or predict innovation. As Veugelers notes, “innovation effects are typically uncertain 
and become clear only over the medium to long-term.”64 
Similar pitfalls affect measures of R&D expenses. Conceptually, R&D spending 
can be analogized with investments in inputs. When this is properly understood, 
decreases in R&D expenses are consistent with welfare enhancing mergers that 
                                                 
63 See Thomas Jaegers, Carmen Lipp-Lingua and Digna Amil, High-technology versus Low-technology Man-
ufacturing: High-technology and Medium-high Technology Industries Main Drivers of EU-27’s Industrial 
Growth, EUROSTAT: STATISTICS IN FOCUS, January 2013.  
64 Veugelers, Innovation in EU Merger Control: Walking the Talk, op cit., page 4. 
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yield productivity gains due to a reduction in the consumption of inputs. Put 
differently, an R&D efficient merger is one in which a decrease in R&D input 
requirements yields constant output (or in which stable R&D input requirements 
yield increased output).65  The widely-held belief that increasing productivity nec-
essarily requires higher investments, including in R&D, is fundamentally un-
sound and not based on proper economics. 66  
Regulators should also exercise caution in their reliance on patent counts and/or 
patent citations to gauge the innovation potential of the merging parties. There 
are two sets of reasons for this. First, even though patent counts and/or citations 
are often used by economists to assess the innovation performance of firms, the 
same economists are well aware that over-reliance on patent counts and/or cita-
tions can paint a misleading picture of the parties’ strength as innovators in terms 
of market impact. There are several reasons for that. To start, patents do not nec-
essarily translate into products that are commercialised. Indeed, “there can be a 
“great gulf between patents filed and what that actually translates on the market.”67  
Moreover, although patent counts and/or citations reflect the degree of academic 
interest that has been generated by a protected technological application, not all 
patents are equal in terms of commercial value. Accordingly, the use of patent 
counts/citations as a measure of innovative strength should be limited to in-
stances where the patent clearly has an actual or potential commercial application 
in those markets that are being assessed. Such an approach would ensure that 
patents with little or no impact on innovation competition in a market are ex-
cluded from consideration. It is also consistent with the Commission’s competi-
tive assessment in Glaxo/Wellcome (see above).  
Furthermore, patent counts and/or citations are crude numbers that do not dis-
count the temporal value of patents and, in particular, do not say much as to 
whether the patent is far from or close to its expiry date. This temporal aspect is 
of significant importance because firms’ incentives to innovate may be stronger 
as a protected technological application approaches patent expiry. With all this, 
                                                 
65 See De Coninck, Innovation in EU merger control: in need of a consistent framework, op cit., page 48 (“In 
fact, the reduction in R&D input can actually be a good thing if it results from synergies that lead to similar or 
better output”). 
66 In his recent speech, Competition and Innovation, Johannes Laitenberger insisted on the role of com-
petition law “in fostering productivity thanks to higher investments, better managerial organisation, and – yes – 
innovation.” See Laitenberger, Competition and Innovation, op cit. 
67 Dow-DuPont Patents Said to Be Scrutinized as EU Weighs Deal, op cit. 
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Hagedoorn and Cloodt note that “[p]atent specialists are somewhat skeptical about 
the counting of patent citations without the necessary in-depth knowledge necessary to in-
terpret the underlying citation reports that accompany each patent” and rightly recom-
mend that the analysis be undertaken with additional indicators.68  
Second, it is entirely unclear that increased market concentration gives rise to lower 
patent counts and/or citations. At the theoretical level, several empirical studies 
suggest that “firms with strong market positions tended to have higher patent counts, 
especially in the citation-weighted patent production function.”69 In a famous 1992 pa-
per called “Schumpeter and Plausible Capitalism,” F. M. Scherer, a notable antitrust 
economist, concluded a review of the literature with the following note: “within 
the subset of companies, or relatively homogeneous divisions of companies, that do perform 
R&D and/or receive patents, R&D spending and patenting tend to rise approximately 
linearly with size (measured by sales).”70 And from a logical standpoint, one fails to 
see how a merger of two firms with similar R&D pipelines can affect patent 
counts/citations. Or put differently, the number of patent counts/citations is not 
determined by the degree of interfirm competition. 
Suppose firms A and B compete on R&D in the hope of obtaining a patent for 
application Z, which will yield 1000 citations. If A wins the race to the patent 
office, it obtains a patent on Z, at the expense of B. There is just one patent on Z 
granted to A, and B will never get a patent on the Z application. Conversely, if B 
wins the race to the patent office, it earns a patent on the Z application at the 
expense of A. In both cases, there is only one patent on application Z that will 
attract 1000 citations in any scenario. Now, if A and B merge, it is AB that will 
win the race to the patent office. AB will obtain on patent on Z which will yield 
the same amount of citations, i.e. 1000. In this variant, the number of patent 
counts and citations remains the same. Regardless of the scenario under review 
— competitive behaviour or a merger transaction — the patent for Z should gener-
ate the same amount of citations. 
                                                 
68 John Hagedoorn and Myriam Cloodt, Measuring innovative performance: is there an advantage in using 
multiple indicators?, RESEARCH POLICY, Volume 32, Issue 8 (2003), pages 1365-79. 
69 Tom Nicholas, Why Schumpeter was right: innovation, market power, and creative destruction in 1920s 
America, JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC HISTORY, Volume 63, Issue 4 (2003), pages 1023-58. 
70 Frederic M. Scherer, Schumpeter and Plausible Capitalism, JOURNAL OF REPRINTS ANTITRUST LAW & 
ECONOMICS, Volume 28 (1998), page 759. 
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C. Qualitative Analysis 
The limitations encountered with the use of quantitative indicators (e.g., R&D 
expenditure, patent counts and/or citations) to assess a merger’s effects on inno-
vation make it even more imperative to complement that analysis with qualitative 
analyses. This is in line with the “fact-intensive, case-by-case inquiries” advocated by 
Shelanski and Katz to assess the incentives and capabilities of actual and potential 
innovators. Central to the assessment of the qualitative dimension of innovation 
competition is an understanding of the key drivers of innovation in an industry. 
In the agrochemical industry, industry structure and market competition may 
only be one amongst many other factors that promote innovation. Virtually all 
studies agree on this. Interestingly, the economic literature on private R&D in 
agrochemical markets underlines the important role that is played by public R&D 
on innovation incentives and to a much lesser extent competition and rivalry. 
This may be attributable to the reasons outlined in this paper that expose the 
difficulty in drawing inferences on the relationship between innovation and mar-
ket structure.71  
Moreover, the impact of wider industry and regulatory developments on incen-
tives to innovate and market structure should not be ignored, e.g., falling crop 
commodity prices, or regulatory restrictions on the use of certain products. In 
agrochemicals in particular, ceasing to innovate is not an option since plant and 
pest resistance force market players to keep inventing new products. Last, agencies 
and regulators should understand that beyond R&D and patent statistics, there 
is also a degree of qualitative competition in the innovation strategies that are 
pursued by agrochemical players. Industry structure as well as internal resources 
and dynamic capabilities give rise to different innovation strategies: some may be 
“economizing” (e.g., engaging in replication or imitation), others may be “strategiz-
ing” (e.g., engaging in strategic conflict) or both.72 It is important to empirically 
grasp the true nature of such approaches prior to drawing conclusions on the 
state of innovation competition in a given industry.  
                                                 
71 See, e.g., Pardey, et al., Long-Run and Global R&D Funding Trajectories: The U.S. Farm bill in a Changing 
Context, op cit. (“For much of modern history, the preponderance of formal global food and agricultural R&D was 
conducted by public agencies, including government research labs and academic institutions…. [P]ublic R&D is 
more of a complement to private R&D, such that a decline in the performance of public research will have negative 
consequences for the longer-run rate of innovation in U.S. agriculture.”). 
72 Joanna Chatawaay, Joyce Tait, and David Wield, Understanding company R&D strategies in agro-biotech-
nology: trajectories and blind spots, RESEARCH POLICY, Volume 33, Issue 6 (2004), pages. 1041-57. 
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D. Presumptions 
The appeal of a theory based on a presumption that regulatory intervention is 
warranted where a merger removes a “parallel path R&D” is not in line with the 
standard of proof required by the EU Courts in Tetra Laval v Commission.73 In that 
case, the EU Courts held that one could not assume that the disappearance of 
the target firm’s innovative capabilities would lead to a “diminished need” for the 
acquiring firm “to innovate following implementation of the modified merger.”74 The 
Court insisted that any such conclusion must be based on a thorough market 
analysis. Particular attention was given to the innovation capabilities of the 
merged entity’s rivals.75   
Prior to the annulment of its decision in Tetra Laval, the Commission’s own de-
cisional practice had carefully avoided relying on a similar presumption. In Glaxo 
Wellcome/SmithKline Beecham, the Commission accepted the idea that mergers 
can lead to the abandonment of product development programmes, provided 
that the level of innovative activities in the overall market remained sufficient.76 
This approach was, and remains, the right one. 
Conclusion 
Much as there is no clear link between market concentration and industry inno-
vation, “the academic literature shows there is no automatic relationship between mergers 
and innovation.”77 This finding should lead any humble antitrust analyst to accept 
that the question remains largely an empirical matter.  
From a policy standpoint, our findings suggest that the application of a theory in 
merger control that draws a potential negative link between increased industry 
concentration and incentives to innovate (like SIII) should be balanced by an 
                                                 
73 Case T-5/02, Tetra Laval v Commission, 2002 E.C.R. II-4381, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/show-
Pdf.jsf?docid=86672&doclang=EN. Judgment of General Court upheld by Court of Justice in Case 
C-12/03, P Commission v Tetra Laval, 2005 E.C.R. I‑987, http://curia.europa.eu/ju-
ris/showPdf.jsf?text=&docid=49926&pageIn-
dex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=412738. 
74 Case T-5/02, Tetra Laval v Commission, op cit., para. 329. 
75 Ibid., para. 330. 
76 Glaxo Wellcome/SmithKline Beecham, op cit, para. 188 (“While it is feasible to believe that the parties will 
streamline their R&D efforts in the future, given the large number of current pipeline products and resourceful 
competitors on the market, the Commission does not consider that this would lead to the diminution of the over-
all R&D potential either.”). 
77 Veugelers, Innovation in EU Merger Control: Walking the Talk, op cit., page 8. 
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equivalent theory that assesses a potential increase in innovation. To put things 
differently, if the Commission wants to introduce a SIII theory to its merger con-
trol practice, then this theory should cut both ways and test not only a “Significant 
Impediment to Industry Innovation” but also a “Significant Increase in Industry Innova-
tion.” 
